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R 201346Z JUL 78 ZFF-5
FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3107
INFO USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS CZ
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JCS WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 CARACAS 6797

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS MPOL VE
SUBJ: SECURITY ASSISTANCE REPORTING - VENEZUELA

REF: (A) STATE 167901, (B) STATE 168320

1. FOLLOWING IS EMBASSY RESPONSE TO REFTEL A,KEYED TO
PARAS IN THAT TELEGRAM.

(3.A.(1)) U.S. INTERESTS SERVED- THE VENEZUELAN
ARMED FORCES ARE THE ULTIMATE ARBITER OF POWER IN THIS
SOCIETY. U.S. INTERESTS ARE SERVED THEREFORE BY THE MAIN-
TENANCE OF AN EFFECTIVE, CLOSE AND PRODUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP
WITH THEM, INCLUDING THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF A DEMOCRATIC
POLITICAL SYSTEM WITH A POSITIVE HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, POTENTIAL
LATIN AMERICAN ARMS REDUCTIONS EFFORTS AND ECONOMIC USE
OF MILITARY RESOURCES. SPECIFICALLY,THE VENEZUELAN MILITARY
PLACE GREAT EMPHASIS ON OBTAINING US TRAINING WHICH THEY
CONSIDER THE MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN US-VENEZUELAN
MILITARY RELATIONS. THEY ALSO PREFER US EQUIPMENT,
DOCTRINE, AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE. THUS, THE MOST
IMPORTANT INGREDIENT IN OUR SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
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HAS BEEN AND CONTINUES TO BE ALLOWING VENEZUELAN MILITARY
OFFICERS EXPOSURE TO US DOCTRINES, CONCEPTS, AND OUR
POLITICAL EXAMPLE. IT ALSO OFFERS US THE OPPORTUNITY TO
DEMONSTRATE TO THE VENEZUELAN MILITARY THAT WE TAKE THEM
SERIOUSLY AS AN INTEGRAL BULWARK OF THE VENEZUELAN POLITI-
CAL PROCESS,AND THAT THE INCREASED SENSE OF INTERDEPENDENCE
WE SEEK WITH VENEZUELA EXTENDS AS WELL TO ITS MILITARY.

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(2) PERCEIVED EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL THREAT AND STRATEGIES-
VENEZUELANS PERCEIVE COLOMBIA AS THEIR PRINCIPAL EXTERNAL
MILITARY THREAT, A THREAT BASED ON LONG-STANDING TERRITORIAL
DISPUTES, REINFORCED BY A SENSE OF CULTURAL INFERIORITY
ON THE PART OF THE VENEZUELANS AND MASSIVE ILLEGAL COLOMBIAN
IMMIGRATION. THE VENEZUELANS DO NOT EXPECT THE COLOMBIANS
TO MOVE AGAINST THEM NOW, PARTICULARLY SINCE THEY VIEW THE
COLOMBIAN CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT AS A RESTRAINT ON ITS OWN
MILITARY. HOWEVER, SHOULD DIFFICULTIES ENSUE, EITHER
THROUGH A COUP IN COLOMBIA, OR A SERIOUS BORDER MISHAP,
THE VENEZUELANS WOULD BE INCLINED TO EXPECT MILITARY
CONFORNTATION WITH COLOMBIA. THUS, ALTHOUGH RELATIVELY
LOW LEVEL, THE PERCEIVED THREAT IS REAL. A SECOND
PERCEPTION OF POTENTIAL THREAT INVOLVES THAT POSED BY
CUBA, PARTICULARLY THE POSSIBILITY OF CUBAN SUPPORT OF
LEFTIST INSURGENT GROUPS IN VENEZUELA. VENEZUELA, TO
COUNTER SUCH ENDEAVORS HAS NOT ONLY DEPLOYED TROOPS AND
POLICE AGAINST THE SMALL INSURGENCY GROUPS, BUT ALSO
DEVOTED CONSIDERABLE INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES TO SURVEILLANCE
OF CUBAN AND CUBAN EXILE ACTIVITIES HERE..

ON ANOTHER LEVEL, VENEZUELA VIEWS BRAZIL AS AN EXPANSION-
IST NATION WITH POTENTIAL IMPERIAL AMBITIONS IN LATIN
AMERICA, AND VENEZUELAN MILITARY PLANS TAKE THIS INTO
ACCOUNT, BUT THE VENEZUELANS HAVE NOT, EITHER TACTICALLY
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OR STRATEGICALLY ORIENTED MAJOR FORCES IN THE DIRECTION OF
BRAZIL. VENEZUELAN MILITARY PLANNERS INCLUDE THE DISPUTED
AREA OF GUYANA, AND THE GULF OF PARIA BETWEEN BENEZUELA
AND TRINIDAD AS POTENTIAL TROUBLE AREAS, BUT DO NOT
PERCEIVE THESE TWO SMALL NATIONS AS EXTERNAL THREATS.

IN MEETING THESE PERECEIVED THREATS, VENEZUELA'S STRATEGY
IS POLITICAL, DIPLOMATIC, AND MILITARY. IT CONSULTS WITH
COLOMBIA ON A VARIETY OF ISSUES TO DEMONSTRATE ITS
INTEREST IN MAINTAINING GOOD RELATIONS. MILITARILY,
VENEZUELA CONTINUES TO MODERNIZE ITS ARMED FORCES AND
DEPLOY THEM STRATEGICALLY RELATIVE TO COLOMBIA. IT CONTINUES
TO DEPLOY SECURITY FORCES AGAINST THE SMALL INSURGENT
GROUPS IN EASTERN VENEZUELA AND MAINTAINS SURVEILLANCE OF
URBAN RADICAL GROUPS.

(3) MISSION'S PERCEPTION OF THE THREAT - THE EMBASSY'S
ASSESSMENT OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF A VENEZUELAN-COLOMBIAN
WAR IS SUBSTANTIALLY LESS THAN THAT PERCEIVED BY THE
VENEZUELAN MILITARY. GIVEN THE HISTORIC MISTRUST BETWEEN
THE TWO COUNTRIES, HOWEVER, WE DO NOT RULE IT OUT ALTHOGETHER,
BUT BELIEVE THAT THE COLOMBIAN MILITARY ARE MUCH MORE

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CONCERNED ABUT INTERNAL SECURITY AND STABILITY THAN THEY ARE IN SEEKING TROUBLE WITH THEIR EASTERN NAEIGHBOR. OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY THREAT IS SIMILAR TO THAT OF THE VENEZUELAN MILITARY, VIZ, THE INSURGENTS ARE CAPABLE OF HARASSMENT BUT LITTLE MORE.

(4) TYPE OF MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT SUITED TO COUNTRY NEEDS- VENEZUELA HAS A RELATIVELY SMALL MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, COMPOSED OF OUR SERVICES: THE THREE TRADITIONAL BRANCHES, PLUS THE NATIONAL GUARD (POLICE AND OTHER SURVEILLANCE AND CONTROL FUNCTIONS). IT HOPES TO MODERNIZE AND EXPAND ITS FLEET, DEVELOP SOME FURTHER AIRBORNE CAPACITY AND IMPROVE MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORT. ITS GOALS ARE QUANTITATIVELY MODEST AND ARE DESIGNED TO
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MEET THE PERCEIVED COLOMBIAN THREAT. EQUIPMENT IS BEING MODERNIZED IN ALL THREE SERVICES, BUT IT IS NOT EXCESSIVE IN COST OR SOPHISTICATION.

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(5) FORCE AND RELATION OT US INTERESTS EA AL- VENEZUELA : A) IS ONE OF TWO FUNCTIONING DEMOCRACIES IN

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SOUTH AMERICAN WITH A POSITIVE HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY B) IS
A SUBSTANTIAL SOURCE OF US OIL; C) IS HOST TO $1.5 BILLION IN
US INVESTMENT; D) IMPORTS OVER $3 BILLION ANNUALLY FROM
US; E) IS THE LOCALE FOR ONE OF THE LARGEST RESERVES OF
UNEXPLOITED PETROLEUM IN THE WORLD; F) IS ASSERTING A
LEADERSHIP ROLE IN LATIN AMERICA (AND IS A FOUNDING
MEMBER OF OPEC); G) SHARES WITH US MUTUAL OBJECTIVES OF
STRENGHENING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, REDUCING NUCLEAR
PROLIFERATION AND CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFER, FURTHERING
HUMAN RIGHTS, OPPOSING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, ET AL.
WITHIN VENEZUELAN DEMOCRACY, THE VENEZUELAN ARMED FORCES
HAVE, DURING THE LAST TWO DECADES FULLY SUPPORTED AND
ENCOURAGED THE MAINTENEANCE OF A DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL
SYSTEM. GIVEN THE FACT THAT THE RELATIVE SIZE AND COST
OF THE VENEZUELAN MILITARY IS SMALL, AND THAT THE MILITARY
HAD DELIBERATELY CHOSEN NOT TO BECOME DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN
THE DEMESTIC POLITICAL PROCESS,IT APPEARS THAT US
INTERESTS ARE,IN FACT, QUITE WELL SERVED BY THE PRESENT
NATURE AND DISPOSITION OF THE VENEZUELAN ARMED FORCES.
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(6) ECONOMIC ANALYSIS - DEFENSE EXPENDITURES REPRESENT
A SMALL PROPORTION OF BOTH VENEZUELA'S GDP AND CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES. IN 1977, THE GOV BUDGETED A TOTAL
OF $636 MILLION FOR DEFENSE, THE EQUIVALENT OF ONLY
5.4 PERCENT OF THE GOAL OR 1.8 PERCENT OF GCP. IN THE
JUST PRESENTED 1979 BUDGET BILL, PROPOSED DEFENSE EXPENDI-
TURES AMOUNT TO $708 MILLION, OR ABOUT 6.5 PERCENT OF THE
BUDGET. WHILE VENEZUELA IS FACING INCREASED BALANCE OF
PAYMENTS AND DEBT SERVICE PROBLEMS, EXPENDITURES FOR
MILITARY PURPOSES HAVE NOT CONTRIBUTED SIGNIFICANTLY
TO THESE PROBLEMS. THE BULK OF VENELZUELA'S IMPORTS AND
PUBLIC SECTOR DISBURSEMENTS ARE FOR MAJOR DEVELOPMENT
PROJECTS, THE COST OF WHICH IS ESTIMATED TO TOTAL OVER
$20 BILLION DURING THE 1976-80 PERIOD. COMPARED TO
THESE EXPENDITURES, THE COST OF MAINTAINING THE
VENEZUELAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IS MINISCULE.

(7-8-9-10) NOT APPLICABLE.

(11) HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS- VENEZUELA IS A STABLE
PRACTICING DEMOCRACY WITH A GOOD HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD.
AS NOTED ABOVE, THE VENEZUELAN ARMED FORCES FULLY
SUPPORT THE PRESENT DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM AND HAVE OVER THE
LAST TWENTY YEARS, WORKED OUT A CAREFULLY ORCHESTRATED
RELATIONSHIP WITH THEIR CIVILIAN COUNTERPARTS. OUR
SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM SHOULD BE TAILORED TO
INDICATE THAT THE USG APPRECIATES THEIR OWN CONCERNS,
AND THAT THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED,WITHIN THE

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LIMITS OF CONGRESSIONAL MANDATES AND EXECUTIVE POLICY,
TO CONTINUE TO MEET PART OF THEIR REQUIREMENTS CONCERNING
TRAINING, CASH PURCHASES, AND COMMERCIAL SALES. A
CESSATION OF IMET TRAINING (PRESENTLY CONTEMPLATED),
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WOULD BE RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY INTERPRETED BY THE VENEZUELAN
MILITARY AS A DIRECT SIGN OF DISAPPROVAL AND/OR LACK
OF INTEREST INTHEIR ROLE IN THEIR SOCITY AND COULD
INCREASE INCREMENTALLY THEIR OWN CONCERN ABOUT THEIR
LEGITIMACY AND HENCE THE EVENTUAL POSSIBILITY THAT THEY
MIGHT SEEK TO INTERVENE DIRECTLY IN THE DOMESTIC
POLITICAL PROCESS. THUS, WE CAN BEST ADVANCE US HUMAN
RIGHTS OBJECTIVES IN VENEZUELA BY VERY LIMITED,BUT
IMPORTANT SYMBOLIC ACTS OF SUPPORT AND APPRECIATION
FOR THE VENEZUELAN MILITARY, VIZ, LIMITED IMET PROGRAM,
AS WELL AS CONTINUED ADVICE AND CONSULTATION ON FMS
CASH PURCHASES.

(12) TO OUR KNOWLEDGE, THERE ARE NO THIRD COUNTRY
MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS. HOWEVER, VENEZUELA IS
ACTIVELY PURSUING MILITARY PURCHASES FROM WESTERN
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (PRIMARILY FRANCE, UK, WEST GERMANY
AND ITALY) AND ISRAEL.

(13) PROGRAM LEVELS - IN RESPONSE TO THIS RUBRIC,
3.A.13 (A THROUGH E), THE EMBASSY HAS DECIDED BECAUSE
OF THE LIMITED AND UNUSUAL NATURE OF THE SECURITY
ASSISTNACE PROGRAM NOT TO FOLLOW THE SUGGESTED FORMAT.
FIRST, THERE IS NO MAP OR FMS FINANCING, AND IT IS
UNLIKELY THAT OUR PROGRAM WILL CONTINUE TO RECEIVE IMET
FINANCING (SEE STATE 179585). THUS, IT IS NOT REALISTIC
TO SPEAK OF THREE SEPARATE PROGRAM LEVELS. RATHER, FOR
THIS EMBASSY, THE CURRENT LEVEL OF SUGGESTED IMET
FUNDING ($100,000) IS THE ABSOLUTE MINIMUM TO ACCOMPLISH

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 4 CARACAS 6797

PROGRAM OBJECTIVES WHICH, IN ESSESNCE, CONSIST IN PROVIDING FUTURE VENEZUELAN SENIOR FIELD GRAD AND GENERAL OFFICERS WITH QUALITY TRAINING COURSES WHICH, INTERMS OF COST, AND EFFICIENCY, GREATLY EXCEED WHAT THE VENEZUELAN SERVICES COULD NORMALLY PROVIDE, GIVEN THEIR OWN BUDGETARY RESTRAINTS,NOT TO MENTION THE SYMBOLIC IMPORTANCE OF THE MAINTENANCE OF THE IMET PROGRAM. SIMPLY PUT, REDUCTION OF IMET BELOW $100,000, BUT AT SOME FIGURE ABOVE ZERO, WOULD BE CONSIDERED AN AFFRONT TO THE VENEZUELAN MILITARY, WHO ARE ALREADY CONCERNED AT THE REDUCTION OF US FUNDING FOR OUR OVERALL SECURITY ASSIS-TANCE PROGRAM. WE THEREFORE DO NOT THINK THT WE CAN, WITHIN HE VERY LIMITED FUNDS REQUEWTED, APPLY A STRICT ZZB APPROACH, SINCE WE SEEK ONE MINIMAL AMOUNT BELOW WHICH IT IS SIMPLY NOT FEASIBLE TO GO. CLEARLY, EMBASSY BELIEVES THT AN INCREMENTAL LEVEL WOULD BE MOST USEFUL, BUT GIVEN THE CONGRESSIONAL RESTRAINTS INVOLVED, WE WILL NOT REQUEST AN AMOUNT BEYOND THE $100,000 LIMIT.

PRESUMING IMET FUNDS FOR FYS 1980, 1981, 1982 ARE AVAILABLE AT $100,000, WE WOULD EXPECT THAT SIX STUDENTS
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WOULD BE TRAINED IN THE US AND 35 INTHE CANAL ZONE SCHOOLS. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE VENEZUELAN MILITARY WOULD EAGERLY ACCEPT WUCH TRAINING SINCE IT IS CONSIDERED TO BE EXCESSINGLY EXPENSIVE TO BE PURCHASED BY THEM UNER THE FMS CASH PROGRAM. THE TRAINING IS NOT AVAILABLE LOCALLY AND WOULD GREATLY ENHANCE VENEZUELAN EXPOSURE TO OUR DOCTRINES AND CONCEPTS AND TO OUR OWN POLITICAL EXAMPLE, AND THEREBY NOT ONLY PROVIDE AVENUES FOR CONTINUED US ACCESS TO FUTURE VENEZUELAN MILITARY LEADERS BUT ALSO BROADEN THEIR OWN PROFESSIONAL PER-SPECTIVES IN THE PROCESS.

AS A FURTHER CAVEAT, IT SHOULD BE MENTIONED THT

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FOLLOWING THE 1976 DIRECT DOD CREDIT FOR $10,000,000
TO THE VENEZUELAN MILITARY,THE USG NOTIFIED THE GOV
THERE WOULD BE NO FURTHER DIRECT CREDITS.THUS, THERE
IS NO FMS FINANCING AVAILABLE TO THE GOV.

(F) SINCE OUR SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM DOES NOT
HAVE MAP,FMS FINANCING, AND WILL PROBABLY HAVE NO IMET
IN THE FUTURE, WE ARE SUBMITTING ONLY THE LEVELS
I-II-III BELOW. BEFORE DOING SO,HOWEVER, IT SHOULD BE
NOTED, FOR DEPARTMENT'S INFORMATION,THAT THE FMS CASH
PROGRAM PROVIDES THEOVERWHELMING PORTION OF THE SECURITY
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM HERE AND THE EMBASSY THEREFORE
PROPOSES A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF THESE ACTIVITIES,
FOLLOWING IS OUR BEST ESTIMATE OF FUTURE FMS CASH SALES
TO THE GOV:
($ MILLIONS)

FY 1980	FY 1981	FY 1982
45.55	95.60	142.10

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AS THE DEPARTMENT UNDERSTANDS, THESE PURCHASES DEPEND ON
VENEZUELAN PRIORITIES AND BUDGETARY CONSIDERATIONS,
AND ARE INDEPENDENT OF USG BUDGETARY LIMITATIONS, EXCEPT
INSOFAR AS BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS WOULD LIMIT THE AMOUNT
OF PERSONNEL AVAILABLE FOR ADMINISTRATION OF THE FMS CASH
PROGRAM.

THE FOREGOING FIGURES ARE EXTRACTS FROM THE MSAP
FOR FY 1980-84. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE SPECIFIC
FIGURES SINCE VENEZUELAN MILITARY EXPENDITUES HAVE
TENDED TO VARY SUBSTANTIALLY FROM YEAR TO YEAR. FOR
EXAMPLE, IN THE EARLY 1970'S, THE VENEZUELANS PURCHASED
LARGE QUANTITIES OF END ITEMS AT A RELATIVELY LARGE COST
WHILE MORE RECENTLY (IN HE MID-1970S) THERE HAS BEEN A
CONSILIDATION WITH EMPHASIS ON THE PROCUREMENTOF
SECONDARY ITEMS AT CONSIDERABLY LESS COST. FOR THE
TIME FRAME 1980-82 PROJECTIONS INDICATE PROCUREMENT OF
END ITEMS ONCE AGAIN AT A RELATIVELY HIGH COST.

TURNING TO PERSONNEL MANNING LEVELS,HEREWITH IS OUR
SUBMISSION: FYS 1980-81-82

	LEVEL I (MINIMUM)	LEVEL II (INTERMEDIATE)	LEVEL III (CURRENT)
US MIL	5	6	6
US CIV	2	2	2
LWR	3	4	4

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BECAUSE OF THE FACTORS MENTIONED IN 3.A.(13), WE ARE CONSILIDATING LEVELS II AND III SINCE, IN TERMS OF PROGRAM WE ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO MAKE A MEANINGFUL DISTINCTION BETWEEN THEM.THE SIX MILITARY POSITIONS (AT LEVELS II AND III) ARE: 1. MILGP COMMANDER; 2) SENIOR ARMY REP; 3) SENIOR NAVY REP; 4) SENIOR AIR FORCE REP; 5) JOINT LOGISTICS ADVISOR (JLA); 6) JOINT TRAINING ADVISOR (JTA).
THE MILGP COMMANDER IS THE MILGP REPRESENTATIVE ON THE COUNTRY TEAM, PROVIDES DIRECTION, GUIDANCE AND COORDIATION FOR THE OPERATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE MILGP AND IS THE FOCAL POINT FOR ALL SECURITY ASSISTNACE MATTERS PERTAINING TO LIAISON WITH THE VENEZUELAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE. THIS POSITION IS ESSENTIAL AT ALL LEVELS. THE THREE SENIOR SERVICE REPRESENTATIVES PROVIDE A FOCAL POINT AND SERVE AS PRIMARY ADMINISTRATORS FOR ALL SECURITRY ASSISTANCE MATTERS FOR THEIR REPRESENTAIVE SERVICES. THESE POSITIONS ARE ESSENTIAL AT ALL MANNING LEVELS.

THE JOINT LOGISTICS ADVISOR MANAGES AND ADMINISTERS THE PRIOR YEAR'S FMS CREDIT PROGRAMS AND SERVES AS THE ADMINISTRATOR AND ACCOUNTANT FOR ALL MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
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SECURITY ASSISTANCES TRANSACTIONS. HE ALSO PROVIDES
LOGISTICAL, ADMINISTATIVE, AND ACCOUNTING MANAGEMENT
EXPERTISE TO EACH OF THE SENIOR SERVICE REPRESENTATIVES AS
WELL AS SERVING AS THE MILGP OPRATIONS AND PLANNING OFFICER.
THIS POSITION IS ESSENTIAL FOR MANNINGLEVELS II AND III.

THE JOINT TRAINING ADVISOR ADMINISTRATORS THE IMET
PROGRAM,THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE FMS CAST TRAINING PROGRAM,
THE EDUCATIONAL TESTING PROGRAM, AND PROVIDES TRAINING AND
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPERTISE TO THE MILGP. THIS POSITION IS
ESSENTIAL FOR MANNING LEVELS II AND III. ALL OF THE ABOVE
US MILITARY POSITIONS ALOS PROVIDE LIAISON BETWEEN THE
VENEZUELAN MILITARY AND THE US MILITARY SERVICES REGARDING
THE US OFFICERS' OWN AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION.

AT MANNING LEVEL I THE POSITIONS OF JLA AND UTA
WOULD BE COMBINED WITH THE OTHER FOUR REMAINING THE SAME.

TO GO TO THIS LEVEL WOULD RUN THE RISK OF SERIOUSLY JEOPAR-
DIZING WORKING LEVEL PROGRAMS WITH THE VENEZUELAN MILITARY
SINCE WE FRANKLY DOUBT THAT A SINGLE US OFFICER COULD BE
MADE AVAILABLE WHO WOULD POSSESS EXPERTISE IN OPERATIONS,
PLANNING, AND OGISTICS AND TRAINING. THUS, SHOULD THESE
TWO SLOTS BE COMBINED, WE WOULD FIND OURSELVES STRIPPED TO
THE BONE AND WOULD NECESSARILY BE OFFERING THE VENZUELANS
A LESS EFFICIENT PROGRAM WITH REDUCED US SALES AND CONSEQUENTLY
INFLUENCE.

THE TWO US CIVILIAN POSITIONS ARE CONSIDERED TO BE
ESSENTIAL AT ALL MANNING LEVELS AND CONSIST OF THE FOLLOWING:
1) ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER; 2) ADMINISTRATIVE CLERK. GHE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER PROVIDES OFFICE MANAGEMENT, LWR
WORK ASSIGNMENTS AND MANAGEMENT, AND SERVES AS THE US
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PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, MILGPR BUDGET CONSULTANT, US TRANSPORTATION
OFFICER AND ACTS AS ADMINISTRATIVE LIAISON WITH OTHER USG
ELEMENTS. THE ADMINISTRATIVE CLERK SERVES AS ASSISTANT
TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER, MAINTAINS THE SECURITY FILES,
DISTRIBUTES CORRESPONDENCE AND SERVES AS APO POSTAL CLERK.
THE VENEZUELAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE PRESENTLY PROVIDES, IN
ADDITION TO THESE SLOTS SHOWN ABOVE, 4 ADDITIONAL VENEZUELAN
POSITIONS FOR THE MILGP. THE FIGURES PROVIDED FOR LWR ARE
THEREFORE CONTINGENT UPON THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE CONTINUING
TO PROVIDE THE SAME NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES. ALL LWR EMPLOYEES
PROVIDE TRANSLATION SERVICES AND/OR CLERICAL SUPPORT.
FOUR SUCH EMPLOYEES ARE ESSENTIAL AT LEVELS II AND III, AND
THREE AT LEVEL I.

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2. DEPARTMENT SHOULD NOTE THAT MUCH OF THE FOREGOING HAS
BEEN DRAWN FROM PREVIOUS EMBASSY SUBMISSIONS, PARTICULARLY
77 CARACAS A-90 AND 77 CARACAS 12032.
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Review Exemptions: n/a
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Review Release Date: n/a
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Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1947199
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SECURITY ASSISTANCE REPORTING - VENEZUELA
TAGS: MASS, MPOL, VE, US
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkvgwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/34683570-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
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